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
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
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will force us to rely more heavily on Reserve Component Forces to accomplish missions once assigned to regular Army units. This study reviews the use of Reserve Component Forces in Central and South America and describes how these forces are utilized to support U.S. Southern Command missions. The study shows how Reserve Component units are used to augment the limited capabilities of U.S. Southern Command while providing units with training that challenges their ability to organize, deploy, sustain themselves and redeploy to the U.S. These exercises are conducted in remote parts of the world and expose our citizen soldiers to the realities of South and Central America. The study briefly reviews the legal debate over deploying National Guard units to Central and South America and provides senior leader assessments concerning this training.

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

U.S. RESERVE COMPONENT TRAINING IN U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND-  
AN EXAMPLE OF TOTAL ARMY CONCEPT

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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U.S. Army War College  
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22 March 1988

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# ABSTRACT

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U.S. RESERVE COMPONENT TRAINING IN U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND-  
AN EXAMPLE OF TOTAL ARMY CONCEPT

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Army leadership is committed to a "Total Army." The Reserve Components are receiving resources that reflect their ever-increasing responsibilities. Equipment is provided to both the Active and Reserve Components according to the philosophy that the first to fight are the first to be equipped. Active and Reserve Components must be able to pack up and deploy to a distant theater of operations, cope with foreign terrain, weather conditions and ways of life; and train side-by-side with each other and our allies. It is this training that often cannot be duplicated or simulated on any stateside Army installation. It is an investment that will pay big dividends in the readiness of the Total Army.<sup>1</sup>

The United States Military establishment, as we know it, is slowly changing. We are faced with officer reductions as well as reductions in the overall end strength of the Army. We face a reduction in the budget that requires us to reevaluate our priorities both in the Department of Defense (DOD) and in each of the unified commands which maintain essential friendly country programs that are vital to our security. These reductions give us less capability to man, train and equip the total force. We must now rely more heavily than ever on the Total Army Concept. We will be forced to turn many of our missions over to the reserve components (RC)-The National Guard and The Army Reserve.

General Carl E. Vuono, Chief of Staff of the Army, recently wrote:

Today we depend on our reserve components not just for potential, as we sometimes did in the past, but for current readiness. We will fight the first battle together. We must design, equip and train our forces and



develop our leaders with that truth in mind.<sup>2</sup>

True enough today, General Vuono's assessment will continue to gain importance next year and for years to come. General Joseph T. Palastra, Jr., Commanding General, Forces Command (FORSCOM), makes a similar observation:

Integral to the success of all FORSCOM missions is the critical dependence on the ARNG and USAR, the reserve components (RC) of the Army. Contrary to times past, the RC is no longer a backup force, but a full partner in our nation's first line of defense.<sup>3</sup>

A responsive, well equipped and highly trained RC is even more essential today as our resources shrink and policy makers reduce the size of the active component (AC).

The importance of the RC has long been noted in Central and South America where reserve units have worked and trained for several years alongside active duty soldiers from U.S. Southern Command. The purpose here is not to debate the importance of the RC. Rather, I will focus on their training in Central and South America, showing how they have been assisting U.S. Southern Command in accomplishing its regional missions. This support augments the limited capabilities of the command. It also provides tough, demanding and realistic training to RC units, which better prepares them for their increased role in the Total Army Concept. This training is ongoing even today despite legal issues that have been raised concerning what role state governors should have in allowing National Guard units to deploy to Central America. These issues have raised serious doubts in some minds concerning the availability of the National Guard for mobilization in the event of a major conflict.

## U.S. Southern Command

Prior to looking at the RC role in the region and the training that reservists receive, let's look briefly at U.S. Southern Command to determine why RC forces are so important to that command. In February 1984 the Commander-in-Chief (CINC), U.S. Southern Command General Paul F. Gorman compared the staffing of his command with that of other unified commands. The comparison showed that not only did other unified commands have larger staffs in total officer strength (USEUCOM 299; USCENTCOM 438; USSOUTHCOM 136) but they had more general officers assigned (10 for USEUCOM; 9 for USCENTCOM; 2 for USSOUTHCOM - one of whom split his duties between those of U.S. Southern Command and the Air Force Headquarters in Panama). Additionally, the average grade of his staff was at the major or captain level - 60 percent. This was not true for other unified commands which had more senior officers.<sup>4</sup> This situation has improved. U.S. Southern Command now has a larger staff and within the past year it has been authorized additional general officer billets. However, the staffing of U.S. Southern Command is still not sufficient to meet all its needs.

The command's area of responsibility covers 20 percent of the landmass assigned to all unified commands, even though it is the smallest unified command in terms of both manpower and operating funds (0.6 percent of Department of Defense manpower and 0.1 percent of the FY 87 Department of Defense budget).<sup>5</sup>

U.S. Southern Command has an Army, Navy and Air Force Component forward deployed in Panama. The Army Component - U.S. Army South (USARSO) has 6,960 soldiers assigned. USARSO has undergone drastic

changes since 1983.6 In 1983 the CINC, U.S. Southern Command established Task Force Bayonet designed to place more emphasis on tactical training for infantry units as well as combat support and combat service support units assigned to Panama. This organizational change was necessary because of the increased role that the Commander, 193d Infantry Brigade (then Brigadier General Fred F. Woerner) was playing in regional duties--mainly in El Salvador, but in other Central and South American countries as well.

In 1984 one of three infantry battalions, a mechanized infantry battalion, was inactivated in an attempt to restructure the 193d Infantry Brigade (Separate) to better support regional missions which required additional intelligence, medical, engineer, signal and logistical support. These changes focused on new missions which were oriented away from Panama and the defense of the Panama Canal. The goal was to reestablish regional military-to-military relationships and assist developing countries with projects associated with nation building activities.

On 4 December 1986, the Colors of U.S. Army South (USARSO) were formally uncased and the 193d Infantry Brigade (Separate) was redesignated as a light infantry brigade. This served to recognize the importance that the Army Component in Panama was playing in regional affairs. Until that time all Army Component activities--which included manning, equipping and resourcing the 193d Infantry Brigade (Separate)--had been provided by FORSCOM. Under this structure, the Army Component Commander was responsible to two, four star commands--FORSCOM and U.S. Southern Command. With the activation of USARSO, the tie to FORSCOM was broken and the Army element became a Major Army Command (MACOM). During this turbulent

3-year period, these organizational changes were accomplished with no increase in total Army strength in Panama.

Two other components of U.S. Southern Command are U.S. Southern Air Force, with 2,360 soldiers and airmen, and U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command, with 419 sailors and Marines.<sup>7</sup> Both commands support U.S. Southern Command missions throughout the region. These commands have made minor organizational changes since 1983 to keep pace with the expanded initiatives and missions in the region. We will not address Air Force and Navy component changes. Instead, we will focus on the role of Army RC forces in the region. Later I will briefly address some essential capabilities which are provided by Air National Guard units in support of U.S. Southern Command.

U.S. Southern Command has reorganized to meet the challenges they face in Central and South America. This tremendous challenge stretches the limited resources of the command, which is responsible for all the land from the southern border of Mexico to the extreme tip of South America. Because of the missions of U.S. Southern Command and the importance of securing our vital "southern flank," it has become essential that RC forces be employed in an economy of force role. Despite inadequate resources, U.S. Southern Command's military means and capabilities contribute to regional security by orienting on the following missions:

- Sustaining professional military-to-military relationships within the frame work of positive government-to-government ties.

- Promoting professional military institutions that support democratic development and respect human rights, are subordinate to civilian control and are committed to high standards of military excellence and ethics.

-Enhancing deterrence in Central America by signaling a firm commitment to the area, assisting in improving the readiness of local militaries and, at the same time, providing high-quality training for U.S. military personnel.

-Assisting in the improvement of regional defense cooperation to counter insurgent unification and narcotics trafficking, to preclude regional conflicts and to encourage collective security.<sup>8</sup>

### The Legal Debate

The debate over the deployment of National Guard units to Central America centers around the role of federal and state governments with respect to the training of National Guard units. Under the "Militia Clause" the Congress has the power "To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia...while the states are reserved the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress."<sup>9</sup>

Records from the Constitutional Convention indicate that the word discipline in the "Militia Clause" was used in the sense of training standards, "since a major concern of the framers was to have available a militia trained to the same uniform standards as the regular Army which could be easily integrated with the Army in time of national need."<sup>10</sup>

Thus the "Militia Clause" gives the states the authority to train the National Guard in accordance with the standards laid down by Congress. The federal government provides the resources to man and equip the National Guard.

Some state governors have challenged the deployment of their National Guard units to Central America. This has raised doubts in the minds of some concerning the availability of National Guard

units should we have to mobilize in the event of a major conflict.

This legal and political debate remains unresolved. However many, including the U.S. Congress, agree that the Total Force Policy as established in 1973 fundamentally changed the role of the National Guard in our national defense policies and issues to include employment. The following statement summarizes current thinking on employment and training of the National Guard from the viewpoint of the federal government:

As a result, the National Guard now is not simply a reserve of individuals and units that provide standby military capacity for the national defense, but are essential, integrated elements of the frontline defense capability of the United States. As a consequence, National Guard units are required by statute to meet the same training and performance standards as active Army and Air Force units. National Guard units are fully integrated into overall defense planning, and are being equipped with the latest and most sophisticated weapons developed by modern technology. 11

Representative G. V. "Sonny" Montgomery, D-Mississippi, a strong supporter of National Guard training in Central and South America, introduced an amendment to Title 10, United States Code which upholds the letter and spirit of the Militia Clause by an explicit statement of what constitutes the "training prescribed by Congress" and which is thus beyond states' authority under the Constitution.<sup>12</sup> The Montgomery amendment was attached to the FY87 Defense Authorization Act which was signed into law on 14 November 1986 as Public Law 99-661 and amended Section 672, Title 10 of the United States Code to say:

The consent of a Governor...may not be withheld (in whole or part) with regard to active duty outside the United States, its territories, and its possessions, because of any objection to the location, purpose, type, or schedule of such active duty.<sup>13</sup>

In effect governors can only withhold their consent in the case of a local emergency which requires the use of the Guard.

The "Montgomery Amendment" is now being challenged on the basis that it "is an unconstitutional infringement on the power of the states by the federal government".<sup>14</sup> This debate does raise some serious doubts concerning the availability of National Guard units in the event of mobilization. However, the impact so far on deployments to Central America have been minimal. This debate must be clarified in the court system so that we can be assured that the National Guard will be a full partner in the Total Force Policy. With the increased requirement for National Guard and Reserve forces this issue must be resolved swiftly.

#### ENDNOTES

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4. Paul F. Gorman, Statement of the Commander in Chief U.S. Southern Command before the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate, p. 1127.

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6. Ibid., p. 26.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., p. 23.

9. Edward J. Philbin, "States' Rights," National Guard, April 1987, p. 22.

10. Philbin. p. 22.

11. Philbin, p. 23.

12. Philbin, p. 26.

13. United States Code, 1982 Edition, Supplement IV, Titles 1-10, January 15 1983 to January 5 1987, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1987, p. 773.

14. Philbin, p. 21.



## CHAPTER II

### THE U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND EXERCISE PROGRAM

The training program of our RC in Central and South America has grown over the years and continues to grow even today. U.S. Southern Command's Army Component has worked with the RC since 1980, when the 193d Infantry Brigade (Separate) was paired with the 53d and 92d Separate Infantry Brigades of the Florida and Puerto Rico Army National Guard respectively under the CAPSTONE/affiliation program for training and mission support. That relationship continues today. Further, RC involvement in the region has expanded to include engineer exercises, medical readiness training exercises (MEDRETE), deployments to assist host country militaries, military police rotations, rotations of public affairs detachments (PADs) and increased augmentation of the U.S. Southern Command and USARSO staff through the Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) program.

In the next few pages I will provide several examples of RC involvement in the region. Most of the time, we hear only, about selected exercises, which may be sensationalized in the press. Most Americans do not understand the total dimensions of the training. The training is not perfect! Many mistakes are made! However, RC units are training to prepare for war. Therefore, we must continue to learn from our mistakes in a effort to improve our readiness. Then we improve our capability to fight and win the first battle of the next war. If our potential enemies fully understand our capability, we may not have to fight that battle. But we must always be ready to fight it. That's why the following exercises have

been so valuable.

Lieutenant General Herbert R. Temple, Jr., Chief, National Guard Bureau, has seen these exercises in U.S. Southern Command develop over the last 3 to 5 years. He offered the following comment during an interview on 27 January 1988:

Our mission and our fundamental strategy is deterrence and my contention from the very beginning is what happens in Central and South America is that it provides an opportunity to test all the elements of deterrence. It shows that we can mobilize and that we can move forces internally within the United States. That they can deploy and they can train and be sustained in remote environments where there is no major US military facility to support them. Now that requires more than just getting there, it requires a significant amount of planning and if you relate that to the strategic environment I contend that what you have done is display to our potential adversaries the fact that we can deploy US forces in those vital areas of the world where the United States has a continuing responsibility and interest. To me I can't think of anything that is more apparent to a potential aggressor than to know that the United States can do that...So it is obviously in concert as to what our national strategy is. To deter war at the same time as you deploy them and train them you have the evidence that they can and will fight. I think that's in concert with our nation's strategy.1

#### Engineer Exercises

In 1984 a combined United States-Republic of Panama engineer training exercise--the first of its kind and scope in Central and South America--was conducted by the Army National Guard and Panamanian military engineers in a remote region of Panama, approximately 150 miles southwest of the Panama Canal. During this two-year exercise, the combined engineer forces constructed 26 miles (42 kilometers) of road, linking the isolated agricultural west coast of Panama's Azuero Peninsula with the rest of the country's road system. This exercise enabled more than 10,000

soldiers to participate in engineer training in Panama during 1984-85. 2

This exercise and all engineer exercises since have been directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), sponsored by U.S. Southern Command. They came under the operational control of the 193d Infantry Brigade, now USARSO. The exercises provided realistic and demanding training in an extremely austere tropical environment which could not be matched in the United States.

During 1986, RC engineers again teamed up with engineers from Panama to build approximately 15 kilometers of road on the Atlantic coast of Panama. This exercise, Costa Abayo-86, included the construction of a bridge over the Rio Indio. It provided outstanding training for over 4,600 Army Reservists and Army National Guard soldiers. This project again showed United States commitment to the area while providing RC forces with a unique and valuable training experience. RC soldiers gained experience in deployment techniques as well as essential training with heavy engineer equipment.3

We are well aware of the controversies associated with this training: What do our RC units really get out of these exercises? Why is the senior leadership of our Army totally committed to continuing these deployments to Central and South America? First of all, these exercises show to our adversaries that we are committed to the region and that we have the capability to deploy forces there. They provide deterrence. Also, they show our friends in the region that we care about them and their people by assisting their nation-building efforts. While we display our commitment to the region, we as well provide the best possible training for our RC

forces. This training simply cannot be matched in the United States in many cases. Engineer and logistical units are required to survey and develop a project. They provide the host nation with a bill of materials (BOM), coordinate that project with host country representatives and senior U.S. Army Headquarters, then develop a force package made up of engineer and logistical support elements to accomplish the mission. United States policy requires the host country to provide the fuel and construction material for all such projects. The United States provides only equipment, personnel and administrative costs. Mission planning and organization often crosses state lines, thereby requiring units to coordinate with other units and states to ensure that the engineer task force has the necessary equipment, personnel and logistical sustainment to accomplish the task. This detailed planning exercises military staffs at all levels and involves them in the same type planning that would be required should we mobilize for war.

Once the planning is completed, the task force has to prepare the equipment for deployment, deploy that equipment to the port of embarkation (POE), and move it to the area of operation. Once the equipment arrives in country, drivers and vehicles are reunited and moved to the exercise area. Some would say that then the most difficult task has been completed. But that is not true. Units then train and sustain themselves on a rotational basis (normally 15-17 days) in an austere environment while completing the engineer project. During the training, many additional activities are conducted: coordination with host country representatives (civilian engineers, military engineers) and host country security elements, including interaction on intelligence matters. Also medical units

provide medical services to the local population and conduct local MEDRETES. The location for these MEDRETES are coordinated with host country officials. They provide our medics and doctors with opportunities to help local people and to treat tropical diseases that are rarely seen in the United States.

Civic Action and humanitarian assistance programs are conducted around project sites to help repair schools and churches, to improve water sources and dig wells, or to improve local community facilities such as playgrounds, soccer fields, or basketball courts. Local officials are provided school supplies as well as clothing, gathered through donations from the United States. These items improve the lives of people who live in these extremely primitive environments. They are greatly appreciated.

Once the project is completed, which is often a major engineering challenge, the logistical process is reversed. Equipment is moved to the POE, processed through customs, and transported back to the United States. The RC soldier then returns home with the satisfaction that he has helped a country in Central or South American improve their nation. He has affected the lives of its people by building roads, bridges, and drainage structures that have a long term impact on the country and its population.

Engineer exercises were also conducted in Honduras in 1986 and 1987. They continue and are now ongoing in 1988 under the exercise name BLAZING TRAILS. When this extensive engineer project is completed it will provide a farm-to-market road in the Aguan Valley of Yoro Department of Honduras (approximately 20 kilometers, 12 miles) and open this area up for agricultural development. This exercise has provided outstanding training to over 5,600 National

Guardsmen and 3,500 Army Reserve personnel during 1986 and 1987 alone.<sup>4</sup> An additional 9,000 active duty and RC members will be involved in the project prior to its projected completion in July of 1988.<sup>5</sup> This road over extremely mountainous and rugged terrain presents a formidable engineering challenge—one that has provided outstanding training to our RC soldiers while exposing them to Honduras and the people who live there.

Besides these RC engineer exercises in Panama and Honduras, one of the best examples of our commitment to the region is the recently completed exercise in Ecuador—Abriendo Rutas (Opening Roads). This exercise which involved over 9,000 citizen soldiers and over 500 active duty soldiers, was originally scheduled for Manabí Province on the western coast of Ecuador. But on 5 March 1987 a series of earthquakes struck Ecuador, killing hundreds of people and leaving more than 75,000 people homeless and totally isolated in Napo Province. The oil pipeline there had also been destroyed. This caused Ecuador to lose over 40 percent of its Gross National Product (GNP), because of decreased oil exports. This crippled an already ailing economy. The only road into the area, a road that serviced the oil pipeline, was completely destroyed. So the area was accessible only by air. Only one airfield was available. Relief operations began immediately to assist those affected.

On 22 March Vice President George Bush met with Ecuadorean President Leon Febres-Cordero in Ecuador and stated "we know right now that the key to recovery is to restore Ecuador's transportation network, roads and bridges are absolutely essential as the first step".<sup>6</sup> So under guidance from JCS, DOD, Department of the Army (DA) and U.S. Southern Command, the exercise originally

scheduled for the coast was switched to Napo Province. Over 550 pieces of equipment were moved from the west coast of Ecuador across the Andean mountains and into the engineer base camp at Archidona. From there engineers began the difficult task of improving 11 kilometers of primitive road between Archidona and the Rio Holiin River. They built a bridge over the Rio Holiin and constructed a road through the jungle eastward towards Loreto. All of this was accomplished during the rainy season in Ecuador when the area received over 95 inches of rain. The road between Archidona and the Rio Holiin was improved, the bridge was built, and approximately 5.5 kilometers of road on the other side of the river was built. The exercise was completed in December 1987, when all personnel and equipment were transported back to the United States. The U.S. soldiers won the hearts and minds of the people by providing a farm-to-market road to over 40,000 Ecuadorians. Also, they engaged in civil action projects to upgrade and repair churches and schools, to improve electric capabilities, to improve or build sports facilities, and to provide medical services.

Asked about the exercise in Ecuador, Lieutenant General Herbert R. Temple, Jr., Chief, National Guard Bureau, had the following comment:

All in all I think the exercise from our standpoint was a great learning experience and if you are going there for training that is an important aspect. But I suspect the cost was significant particularly to the United States Government but it is in keeping with our commitment to the Ecuadorians which was made by our Vice President at the urging of the President of Ecuador. I think we satisfied our diplomatic responsibility to that country and we got some remarkable training.<sup>7</sup>

Major General William F. Ward, Jr., Chief, Army Reserve stated that "the units did superbly during the exercise, particularly if

measured against the engineering challenge.<sup>8</sup>

### Military-to-Military Exercises

Many of the training benefits that we have noted in these engineer exercises hold true for any type exercise. The training spans the entire spectrum of what would be required should we have to deploy for war. Military-to-military exercises are also being conducted throughout the region. Many of these exercises are conducted in Honduras. Two will be briefly mentioned. The many additional exercises there support the United States presence at Palmerola, the home of Joint Task Force-Bravo (JTF-Bravo), a logistical element that supports the U.S. presence in Honduras. Many of these exercises are conducted by RC units and provide support to the temporary U.S. base there. They support engineer activities, medical activities and logistics functions. The two military-to-military exercises we will review augment the efforts of U.S. Southern Command by providing support that is not available in Panama or may be available but only in limited quantities--such as artillery.

Big Pine III was conducted during March 1985. It included soldiers from Headquarters Company and Company C, 3rd Battalion, 141st Infantry and Company B, 6th Battalion, 112th Armor, Texas National Guard. The units involved deployed 17 M-60 tanks, 17 M-113 armored personnel carriers, 77 wheeled vehicles, and more than 450 soldiers to Honduras to support the exercise.<sup>9</sup> The main purpose of the combined exercise was training for the RC unit as well as training for Honduran forces on anti-armor techniques. This would



enable them to better defend their country from a possible Nicaraguan invasion. Again we showed our commitment to the area and proved that we could deploy armor forces to meet a threat if required.

In the fall of 1986 the American press within Honduras was concerned about the arrival of an artillery unit from Florida. They questioned the unit's mission and speculated that it might involve more than just training. Much of that speculation appeared in U.S. newspapers and on nightly news broadcasts. But the mission was nothing more than combined training with another Honduran artillery unit. Task Force 116 was a mix of artillerymen from the 2nd Battalion, 116th Artillery and several Spanish translators from the 124th Infantry based in Miami. The unit had deployed 120 soldiers to Honduras to train with their Honduran counterparts and to practice falling in on another unit's equipment. The howitzers, vehicles, and tents that Task Force 116 used were transferred from a previous exercise recently completed by the Oklahoma National Guard.<sup>10</sup>

During the combined training a Nicaraguan-Honduran border skirmish broke out and all but one Honduran battery was deployed forward to support the battle. On 7 December 1986, the final Honduran artillery battery was deployed forward and the American unit returned to Palmerola. The training had benefited both the Americans and the Hondurans, but the exercise was halted so that the war could go on without direct American involvement.

The U.S. Southern Command military-to-military program is an essential part of the command's overall strategy in the region. As we have seen, the RC play a key role in that program. This role is

much larger than simply participating in the two exercises mentioned above. The RC units get outstanding training to improve their readiness, also the readiness of host country militaries in the region is upgraded.

#### Affiliation/CAPSTONE Program

The cornerstone of the U.S. Southern Command and 193d Infantry Brigade RC program over the years has been the Affiliation/CAPSTONE Program. This program involves a total commitment to the training and readiness of the 53d Separate Infantry Brigade in Florida and 92d Separate Infantry Brigade in Puerto Rico. The 193d Infantry Brigade established a program that places one of its two infantry battalions in continuous support of one of these two brigades. The battalions support Annual Training (AT) with training assisters down to platoon level and an opposing force company to make the training more realistic, while reducing the RC unit's burden for providing its own opposing force. The battalion additionally is charged with developing an evaluator package for all elements: artillery, communications, aviation, engineer and support units. This total package of evaluators, training assisters and opposing force normally ranges from 275 to 350 personnel who support each AT period in Florida and Puerto Rico.

The 193d Infantry Brigade also sponsors an annual exercise in Panama named Total Warrior. This exercise is based on a Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) scenario. Both the 53d and 92d deploy one infantry battalion to Panama for consecutive 2-week training periods. This battalion is employed and evaluated while the 193d Infantry Brigade provides all training support, including training assisters, opposing forces, range personnel and evaluators.

Deploying units utilize the 193d Infantry Brigade's equipment as much as possible to reduce airlift requirements and costs. This has proved effective. But since the brigade has reorganized to a light configuration while the RC units are still organized along conventional infantry authorizations it is more cumbersome.

In addition to Total Warrior and AT support in Florida and Puerto Rico, the 53d and 92d participate in a yearly combined training exercise named Kindle Liberty with our Panamanian counterparts. The 53d normally deploys one infantry battalion, while the 92d provides opposing force support and selected combat service and combat service support units. Without this augmentation, USARSO would not be able to deploy units outside the original canal zone with adequate logistical support. The Kindle Liberty exercise for 1988 has been cancelled because of recent political differences between the United States and Panama. This entire program is coordinated between the 193d Infantry Brigade and the 53d and 92d Separate Infantry Brigades. Their relationship exemplifies what the Total Army Concept stands for.

#### Medical Readiness Training Exercises (MEDRETE)

MEDRETEs have been conducted throughout the U.S. Southern Command area of operations. They have become a standard component of large scale exercises. These programs of humanitarian assistance support the concept of nation building. Also, they provide excellent training for medical and support personnel. Exercises such as these improve our image in the selected country. They also improve relationships between the citizens and the government (especially the military) of the host country. These exercises are coordinated with the respective host country through the U.S.

Military Group. Combined medical teams, consisting of doctors, dentists, veterinarians, translators and medical support personnel, are then deployed to remote areas. They provide medical and dental care for residents of the selected community as well as veterinary care for livestock in the area. Residents normally come from miles around, some walking for hours, for the opportunity to see a doctor or dentist.

In recognition of this growing medical requirement, three buildings were refurbished outside of Fort Kobbe in Panama to support RC units with prepositioned equipment and vehicles. This is the first equipment site specifically set up to support RC units exclusively. The Field Medical Training Site (FMTS) as it is called, can support up to three clearing platoons simultaneously with vehicles and equipment.<sup>11</sup> In some cases medical units would deploy to Panama, pick up their equipment and vehicles, if needed, and immediately redeploy to another country to provide needed medical care in support of some major U.S. exercise. RC medical units have in the past participated in exercises such as Blazing Trails, Kindle Liberty, Big Pine III, Total Warrior and Blacklight, a series of U.S./Panamanian medical exercises. RC participation in FY 88 is scheduled to increase. It will include 12 MEDRETE missions in the U.S. Southern Command area of operation.<sup>12</sup>

#### Public Affairs Detachments (PAD)

On 29 January, 1988 Massachusetts Governor Michael S. Dukakis, Democratic candidate for President, filed suit to prevent the deployment of the 65th Public Affairs Detachment to Honduras.<sup>13</sup> He thus legally formalized the issue of the deployment of National Guard and Reserve forces to Central and South America. PADs have

been deployed to Panama since 1986 on a continuing basis. They augment the capabilities of public affairs organizations at U.S. Southern Command and USARSO. The PADs provide coverage of RC training for various national, state and local newspapers as well as military publications. They seek to tell the story of citizen-soldier training. After deployment to Panama they may be redeployed to RC training sites in Honduras, Ecuador or other locations within the region to provide this service. They provide a valuable service in getting the story across not only for the RC but for the Army and the nation.

#### Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) Program

The AGR program in U.S. Southern Command is yet another success story. The strength of the USAR Army's AGR program for the entire Army has risen from 2,480 at the end of FY 79 to an authorized end strength of 12,407 in FY 87.<sup>14</sup> The ARNG program increased by 4.33 percent in FY 87 to a total strength of 25,237.<sup>15</sup> This program places RC officers and noncommissioned officers on extended active duty (normally 3-year tours) at various headquarters and units throughout the Army.

This program provides key staff officers for U.S. Southern Command, USARSO and JTF-Bravo to name only a few. These officers/noncommissioned officers advise active component commanders on the unique nature and special requirements of both the Army Reserve and Army National Guard. They also ensure that active component commanders and staff officers understand the essential differences between active component and RC units. This augmentation enables U.S. Southern Command and subordinate units to plan, organize and direct activities vital to the region which would

otherwise not be done because of manpower shortages.

One of the best examples of the AGR program at work in the region was the formation of an exercise division within the G-3 Directorate of the 193d Infantry Brigade in June 1985. This organization continues today as Exercise Directorate, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS). This Directorate is totally manned by AGR personnel (approximately 12 officers) on three-year tours from both the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. The Directorate was established to assist USARSO in developing, coordinating, managing and executing an aggressive exercise program in Central and South America which would provide training for active component as well as RC personnel. This Directorate has become the "key office" for exercise planning in the region. It has furthered the image of U.S. Southern Command, USARSO and the U.S. Army in this increasingly important and strategic region of the world. To show his total commitment to this program, Lieutenant General Herbert R. Temple, Jr., Chief, National Guard Bureau, has dedicated a C-12 aircraft and crew to USARSO and the exercise directorate. This aircraft is used to better coordinate these vital exercises and provides VIP transportation to remote training sites.

#### Air National Guard

Another key player in U.S. Southern Command is the Air National Guard (ANG). The ANG provides continuous support to the region with both equipment and personnel. The Volant Oak program provides C-130 support to the entire region. Six C-130 aircraft and approximately 105 ANG personnel are at Howard Air Base in Panama at any given time.<sup>16</sup> Their missions include search and rescue, Central and South America U.S. embassy resupply, and missions in support of operations

and exercises as directed by U.S. Southern Command.

The ANG additionally provides year-round rotational deployments of 4 A-7 fighter aircraft in support of the defense of the Panama Canal. This mission, called Coronet Grove, was initiated in 1978; approximately 54 personnel support the mission at Howard at any one time.<sup>17</sup> Additionally, the ANG supports major exercises in the area such as Big Pine, Kindle Liberty, Blazing Trails and Abriendo Rutas 87, just to name a few. Needless to say this support is crucial to the mission of U.S. Southern Command. Again, it shows the magnitude of the support provided by RC units and individuals in the region. Without this essential program, U.S. Southern Command's air support to the region would be virtually nonexistent.

All of these programs assist U.S. Southern Command and USAKSO in accomplishing their mission while providing outstanding training to all concerned. This brief review by no way covers all the programs. Many more smaller programs have not been discussed. Units in Panama constantly develop new initiatives to utilize RC resources while training them to fulfill their part of the Total Army Concept. Programs that we have not discussed are unit rotations to the Jungle Operation Training Center (JOTC) at Fort Sherman, Military Police Rotations, the Key Personnel Upgrade Program (KPUP) and engineer programs to refurbish facilities in Panama, such as the FMTS. Also selected personnel, especially Spanish speakers, augment a variety of missions in support of the U.S. Southern Command exercise program.

Major General William F. Ward, Jr., Chief, Army Reserve is also very enthusiastic about the training that his soldiers receive in U.S. Southern Command. His remarks clearly sum up the importance of

these outstanding training opportunities which measurably improve the readiness of the RC while augmenting U.S. Southern Command:

The training in South and Central America is fantastic...I'm very enthused about the training. Wished we had done it for a number of reasons 30 years ago during the Alliance for Progress days. It is very relevant training, it's tough, not only the issues of how you deploy people, but the work they do down there, it stretches you not only physically but psychologically and the kind of psychological tension it puts people under in order to get a job done within a time frame is tremendous. Extremely important. It mentally prepares units for their ability to go to war and get the job done.18

#### ENDNOTES

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2. U.S. Southern Command, Public Affairs Office, Army Engineers Building Roads and Bridges in Latin America, p. 3.
3. Ibid., p. 2.
4. Ibid., p. 8.
5. Larry Carney, "Reservists Deploy to Honduras Road Project," Army Times, 7 December 1987, p. 35.
6. Ibid., p. 11.
7. Interview with Herbert R. Temple, Jr., LTG, Chief, National Guard Bureau, Washington, 27 January 1988.
8. Interview with William F. Ward, Jr., MG, Chief, Army Reserve, Washington, 2 February 1988.
9. Michael Brown, "Big Pine III," Soldiers, September 1985, p. 13.
10. Dennis Steele, "America's Amigos," Soldiers, June 87, pp. 14-15.
11. Dan Bradford, "Panama's Fort Kobbe Houses Medical POMCUS," National Guard, November 1987, p. 34.
12. Bradford, p. 34.
13. Larry Carney, "Dukakis Sues Against Deployment," Army Times, 22 February 1988, p. 35.



14. Department of Defense, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, Posture of the Army Reserve FY 88, pp. 19-21.

15. Department of Defense, Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs Fiscal Year 1987, 2 February 1988, p. 53.

16. Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau Public Affairs Office, National Guard Participation in Central America, 11 February 1986, p. 1.

17. Ibid., p. 2.

18. Interview with William F. Ward, Jr., MG, Chief, Army Reserve, Washington, 2 February 1988.

## CHAPTER 111

### SENIOR LEADER ASSESSMENTS

Now that we have reviewed RC training in the U.S. Southern Command, we should review relevant comments by some senior leaders in U.S. Southern Command. During a trip to Central and South America in May 1987, the Reserve Forces Policy Board saw RC training firsthand and were briefed by senior officers and representatives in the area. During this visit General John R. Galvin, former CINC, U.S. Southern Command, and Major General Bernard Loeffke, Commanding General, U.S. Army South

emphasized the importance of Reserve Component training exercises to the SOUTHCOM mission. The National Guard and Reserves contribute to our national security strategy in that area as full partners in force presence in the area which demonstrates U.S. resolve and commitment to promoting democracy, supporting stability, and assisting in nation building. They contribute to deterrence strategy by demonstrating their capabilities to potential adversaries. The Reserve Component units and individuals training in the SOUTHCOM area are receiving exceptionally valuable training that is realistic, challenging, mission-oriented, and readiness enhancing.<sup>1</sup>

During testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, on 4 February 1988, General Fred F. Woerner, CINC, U.S. Southern Command made the following statement concerning force presence and exercises:

Force presence through forward stationing in Panama and exercises serves to deter Cuban/Nicaraguan aggression and to reassure our democratic allies in the region. Further, having these theater resources permits us to train with host nation forces for the type of

warfare most likely to be encountered. Exercises and service funded deployments for training (DFT's) from all four services--often engineer and medical forces--are our primary means for achieving a benevolent force presence throughout the Southern Command area of responsibility. The JCS exercises and deployments for training (DFT's) are at times our only effective medium for working with host nation militaries. Any cuts in funding for JCS exercises or service Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) would deprive me of a major force option in my theater strategy.

Both JCS exercises and DFT's require hard-won political and funding commitments from the host nation. Reduction of funding or congressional support forcing cancellation of these exercises on our part sends the wrong signal about our interests in the region.<sup>2</sup>

During an interview in Panama in January 1988 General Woerner reaffirmed his commitment to the Total Force Concept by stating:

We depend heavily on reserve forces, like engineers and medical units, to assist this command in the region. We depend more on engineers or medics than we do on infantry or artillery for force presence...There is more opportunity for engineer forces of all services to operate in this theatre and more closely approximate their wartime mission than you can find any place else in the world because we can offer the opportunity for deployment, operating out of a bare base environment with all its requirements for sustainment, executing wartime missions, relatively unconstrained ecologically, but not in disrespect there of. Also you get to redeploy. In this region medics and engineers especially engineers become a maneuver element of the strategy for the low intensity environment and are in fact our first line of defense.<sup>3</sup>

General Woerner additionally highlighted the following multiple purposes for using RC units/individuals in the region:

-As an operational element to further United States policy. An element that would not otherwise be available to the command.

-The training opportunity in purity can't be matched anywhere else in the world.

-Contributes to the development of host nations by building roads, bridges and providing medical care. These strengthen United States ties with people in the region-people-to-people contact.

-Contributes to the military skills of host nation militaries. These militaries then provide a service to better the lives of their own countrymen.

-Strengthens our own soldiers by exposing them to the realities of the people and the region. Reinforces their belief in democracy and hopefully increases the awareness of the soldier and the people he contacts when he returns home.

-Contributes to recruiting and retention in both the National Guard and Army Reserve.

-Cost effective to train in the U.S. Southern Command area in comparison to other options such as Europe or Korea.<sup>4</sup>

It is easy to understand the close relationship that has developed between U.S. Southern Command and the the RC. U.S. Southern Command needs RC units and soldiers to accomplish their many diverse missions in Central and South America. The RC get realistic training in an austere environment fairly close to the United States; at the same time they have a real impact on the region. U.S. Southern Command also augments its limited resources and draws from the resources of the RC. This is easily understood when we realize that by 1990 the dual-career soldiers of the RC will make up more than half of the total Army personnel strength. The RC currently provides 64 percent of the combat engineer battalions, 64 percent of the 510 medical units, 97 percent of the civil affairs capability and 99 percent of the psychological operations units in the Army.<sup>5</sup> U.S. Southern Command is using the Total Army Concept fully to restore democracy and true stability to the region. RC units are crucial to the mission of U.S. Southern Command and are in fact General Woerner's first line of defense in the region.

# ENDNOTES

1. Department of Defense, Reserve Forces Policy Board, Overseas Study of Reserve Component Issues, May 1987, p. 14.
2. Fred F. Woerner, Statement of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command before the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Defense, 4 February 1988, pp. 18-19.
3. Interview with Fred F. Woerner, General, Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command, Quarry Heights, Panama, 8 January 1988.
4. Ibid.
5. Department of Defense, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, Posture of the Army Reserve FY 88, pp. D-7-D-19.

## CHAPTER IV

### CONCLUSIONS

Over the last few months we have seen signs that our commitment to peace in Central and South America is diminishing. We have seen a reduction in security assistance funding, a "No" vote on continued support to the Contras in Nicaragua, and a reduced budget for the Department of Defense. No doubt all of this will impact on some U.S. Southern Command programs. However, at the same time we see no reduction in aid to Nicaragua from Cuba and the Soviet Union as these countries continue to export revolution to Central and South America. We see a very unstable situation in that part of the world. If it continues this situation could threaten the security of the United States.

This is a critical time for our security. The U.S. Southern Command exercise program has provided and can continue to provide outstanding training to both active and RC forces. At the same time RC forces augment the limited capabilities of U.S. Southern Command, enabling it to establish meaningful relationships with countries and militaries in the region. Through this aggressive exercise program, we reinforce military-to-military relationships while assisting countries with the development of their emerging economies by improving their marginal transportation systems. These exercises also provide a mechanism to establish dialogue with countries and militaries in the region.

Exercises in the region, especially RC engineering exercises,

are particularly valuable in opening channels of communications between many agencies in the U.S. Department of State and Defense, between Major Headquarters of the Army, between reserve and active components of the Army and Air Force, between host countries and our country teams, between host country cabinet level organizations, and between many other special agencies which provide services to the Army in the field. This dialogue then leads to improved coordination and a greater understanding of the challenges that we all face together. Improved dialogue also reinforces the other pillars of United States policy in the region, a policy of Democracy, Development, Dialogue and Defense.

RC exercises in the U.S. Southern Command are an essential part of the Total Army Concept. Units, both active and reserve, work side-by-side on these projects. All participants get realistic, mission-oriented and valuable training. They learn how to work with one another while exchanging information. Citizen soldiers also become better informed about an area of the world that is vital to United States interests. These soldiers then return home with a better understanding of the real situation in Central and South America. They are better informed citizens.

This training of RC units and individuals must continue in the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility. However, we must also be realistic. We should tailor our forces, including personnel and equipment, to the minimum essential to accomplish the task or complete the project. In the past we have attempted to maximize training for RC units. Thus, we increased the number of soldiers who deployed to the region without a proportional growth in mission accomplishment. This is especially true in the case of engineer

projects. We have to realize that funding may be limited and prioritize our missions accordingly. We also need to balance our focus between training and mission accomplishment. We deploy units to train and better prepare themselves for war. However, in the eyes of the host country we are evaluated according to what we leave. If we deploy for six months and leave only 1 kilometer of road, or if we provide medical services that cannot be sustained over a period of time we may not have left a positive impression on the country. So we must balance training and mission accomplishment. We must remember that every soldier who deploys to the region is an ambassador for the United States.

The active components also have a major role to play while assisting RC units with their training. Active duty officers, noncommissioned officers and soldiers must provide assistance, advice, support and tactical and technical expertise to our partners in the Total Force. This support must be provided during all phases of the deployment or annual training period. We must work together to refine Mission Essential Task Lists (METL) while identifying deficiencies. AC units must work with RC units to correct those deficiencies in an effort to improve our warfighting capability. We must tell it "like it is" in an effort to improve the overall quality of the force. The active force must work harder to understand the increasing role RC forces play in the Total Army Concept. The senior leadership in the Army must lead the way in educating the Army about the increasing role RC forces play in the Total Army Concept.

The U.S. Southern Command exercise program provides outstanding training to RC units. This training emphasizes every aspect of their



ability to organize, deploy, move to the designated area. It trains them to sustain themselves and accomplish their assigned mission. They conduct this training alongside their active duty counterparts in many countries in Central and South America. We are working together as a team to improve the capabilities of the Total Force while promoting democracy in the region through military-to-military and people-to-people contacts. This effort must continue. The U.S. Southern Command exercise program truly implements the Total Force Concept while reinforcing the command's ability to implement U.S. policy in the region. The training of National Guard and Reserve units in the U.S. Southern Command area of operations prepares them for war while improving the command's capability to defeat external aggression at the Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) end of the Probability of Conflict Spectrum.

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